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Epistemic negation not along with default negation ¬ plays a key role in knowledge 
representation and nonmonotonic reasoning. However, the existing epistemic approaches 
such as those by Gelfond [13,15,14], Truszczynski [33] and Kahl et al. [18] behave not 
satisfactorily in that they suffer from the problems of unintended world views due to 
recursion through the epistemic modal operator K or M (KF and MF are shorthands 
for ¬not F and not¬F , respectively). In this paper we present a new approach to 
handling epistemic negation which is free of unintended world views and thus offers a 
solution to the long-standing problem of epistemic speciﬁcations which were introduced 
by Gelfond [13] over two decades ago. We consider general logic programs consisting 
of rules of the form H ← B , where H and B are arbitrary ﬁrst-order formulas possibly 
containing epistemic negation, and deﬁne a general epistemic answer set semantics for 
general logic programs by introducing a novel program transformation and a new deﬁnition 
of world views in which we apply epistemic negation to minimize the knowledge in 
world views. The general epistemic semantics is applicable to extend any existing answer 
set semantics, such as those deﬁned in [26,27,32,1,8,12,29], with epistemic negation. For 
illustration, we extend FLP answer set semantics of Faber et al. [8] for general logic 
programs with epistemic negation, leading to epistemic FLP semantics. We also extend 
the more restrictive well-justiﬁed FLP semantics of Shen et al. [29], which is free of 
circularity for default negation, to an epistemic well-justiﬁed semantics. We consider the 
computational complexity of epistemic FLP semantics and show that for a propositional 
program  with epistemic negation, deciding whether  has epistemic FLP answer sets is 

p
3 -complete and deciding whether a propositional formula F is true in  under epistemic 
FLP semantics is p4 -complete in general, but has lower complexity for logic programs that 
match normal epistemic speciﬁcations, where the complexity of world view existence and 
query evaluation drops by one level in the polynomial hierarchy.
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the 
CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
1. Introduction
Answer set programming (ASP) is a major logic programming paradigm rooted in knowledge representation and reason-
ing (KR) for modeling and solving knowledge-intensive search and optimization problems such as product conﬁguration and 
planning [2]. In ASP, the semantics of a logic program is given by a set of intended models, called stable models or answer 
sets [16,17]. Such answer sets can be deﬁned in different ways; Lifschitz [21] listed thirteen of them in the literature. These 
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with aggregates [30,8], with external sources such as description logic programs (dl-programs) [7], and with propositional 
or ﬁrst-order formulas [26,27,32,1,12]. Most recently Shen et al. [29] introduced a new one called the well-justiﬁed FLP an-
swer set semantics, which is fundamentally distinct from other existing answer set semantics in that every answer set of a 
general logic program is justiﬁed by having a level mapping and thus is free of circular justiﬁcations. This semantics has 
been implemented over the well-known ASP reasoner dlvhex.1
Negation is a key mechanism in ASP for reasoning with incomplete knowledge. There are two major types of negation, 
default negation and epistemic negation. A third, called strong negation, also appears in the literature; when default negation 
is available, strong negation is easily compiled away using new predicate symbols [17] and thus it can be omitted. By abuse 
of notation, in this paper we use ¬, not and ∼ to denote the three negation operators, respectively.2 For a formula F , 
the default negation ¬F of formula F expresses that there is no justiﬁcation for adopting F in an answer set and thus F
can be assumed false by default in the answer set; in contrast, the epistemic negation not F of F expresses that there is 
no evidence proving that F is true, i.e., F is false in some answer set. Justiﬁcation in ASP is a concept deﬁned over every 
individual answer set, while provability is a meta-level concept deﬁned over a collection of answer sets, called a world view. 
This means the two types of negation are orthogonal operations, where default negation works locally on each individual 
answer set, and epistemic negation works globally at a meta level on each world view.
With both default and epistemic negation, ASP is enabled to reason with different incomplete knowledge. For example, 
we can use the rule
innocent(X) ← not guilty(X)
to concisely express the presumption of innocence, which states that one is presumed innocent if there is no evidence proving 
s/he is guilty. We can also use rules of the form
¬p(X) ← not p(X)
to explicitly state Reiter’s closed-world assumption (CWA) [28], i.e., if there is no evidence proving p(X) is true we jump to 
the conclusion that p(X) is false.
However, observe that most of the existing answer set semantics, such as those deﬁned in [17,26,27,32,1,8,12,29], only 
support default negation and they do not allow for epistemic negation.
Epistemic negation and speciﬁcations. In fact, the need for epistemic negation was long recognized in ASP by Gelfond in 
the early 1990s [13,15] and recently revisited in [14,33,19,18,4]. In particular, Gelfond [13] showed that formalization of 
CWA using default and strong negations with rules of the form
∼p(X) ← ¬p(X)
as presented in [17], is problematic.3 He then proposed to address the problem using two epistemic modal operators K
and M. Informally, for a formula F , KF expresses that F is true in every answer set, and MF expresses that F is true in 
some answer set. Note that MF can be viewed as shorthand for ¬K¬F .4
In the sequel, by an object literal we refer to an atom A or its strong negation ∼A; a default negated literal is of the form 
¬L, and a modal literal is of the form KL, ¬KL, ML or ¬ML, where L is an object literal.
Gelfond [13] considered disjunctive logic programs with modal literals, called epistemic speciﬁcations, which consist of 
rules of the form
L1 ∨ · · · ∨ Lm ← G1 ∧ · · · ∧ Gn (1)
where each L is an object literal and each G is an object literal, a default negated literal, or a modal literal. A normal epistemic 
speciﬁcation consists of rules of the above form with m = 1. Given a collection A of interpretations as an assumption, a logic 
program  is transformed into a modal reduct A w.r.t. the assumption A by ﬁrst removing all rules with a modal literal 
G that is not true in A, then removing the remaining modal literals. The assumption A is deﬁned to be a world view of 
if it coincides with the collection of answer sets of A under the semantics deﬁned in [17].
The problem with recursion through K. More recently, Gelfond [14] addressed the problem that applying the above ap-
proach to handle modal literals may produce unintuitive world views due to recursion through K. For example, consider a 
logic program  = {p ← Kp}. The rule expresses that for any collection A of answer sets of  and any I ∈A, if p is true 
in all answer sets in A, then p is true in I . This amounts to saying that if p is true in all answer sets, then p is always true 
(in particular in all answer sets). Obviously, this rule is not informative and does not contribute to constructively building 
any answer set; thus it can be eliminated from , leading to  = ∅. As a result,  is expected to have a unique answer 
1 www.kr.tuwien.ac.at/research/systems/dlvhex.
2 In many texts, not and ¬ are used to denote the default and strong negation operators, respectively.
3 We will further discuss this issue in Remark 3 following Example 4.
4 Note that ¬KF and ∼KF are semantically equivalent. In [13], MF is shorthand for ∼K ∼F , while in [14], it is shorthand for ∼K¬F , which is semanti-
cally equivalent to ¬K¬F .
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sumption A = {{p}}, i.e., p is assumed to be true in all interpretations in A. Then, Kp is true in A and we obtain the modal 
reduct A = {p}. This reduct has a unique answer set {p}, which coincides with the assumption A. Thus A is a world view 
of  under Gelfond [13]. Observe that this world view has an epistemic circular justiﬁcation that can be expressed as
∃I∈A p ∈ I ⇐ Kp ⇐ ∀I∈A p ∈ I (2)
where the arrow ⇐ stands for “is due to.” That is, p being true in an interpretation I = {p} of the world view A is due to 
Kp being treated true in the program transformation for the modal reduct A (via the rule p ← Kp), which in turn is due 
to p being assumed to be true in all interpretations of A.
In general, a world view A is said to have an epistemic circular justiﬁcation if some object literal L being true in some 
interpretation I ∈A is due to KL (or its equivalent modal literals expressing that L is true in every interpretation J ∈A) 
being treated true in the program transformation for the modal reduct of  w.r.t. A. This means that L being true in some 
interpretation of A is due to L being assumed to be true in all interpretations of A.
To remedy the epistemic circular justiﬁcation problem with recursion through K, Gelfond [14] revised the program 
transformation such that a modal reduct A is obtained from  by ﬁrst removing all rules of form (1) with a modal literal 
G that is not true in A, then removing all modal literals ¬KL and ML, and ﬁnally replacing all modal literals KL by L and 
¬ML by ¬L.
It is easy to check that the logic program  = {p ← Kp} has a unique world view {∅} when applying the revised 
program transformation. Unfortunately, the epistemic circular justiﬁcation problem persists in other logic programs, such 
as  = {q ←¬Kp, p ←¬q}. Consider an assumption A = {{p}}. Since Kp is true in A, the modal literal ¬Kp is not true 
in A and thus the ﬁrst rule is removed, yielding the modal reduct A = {p ← ¬q}. This reduct has a unique answer set 
{p}, which coincides with A, hence A is a world view of . Note that this world view has also an epistemic circular 
justiﬁcation
∃I∈A p ∈ I ⇐ ¬q ⇐ ¬Kp ⇐ ∀I∈A p ∈ I,
i.e., p being true in an interpretation I = {p} of the world view A is (via the rule p ←¬q) due to q being false in I , which 
in turn (via the rule q ←¬Kp) is due to Kp being treated true and thus ¬Kp treated false in the program transformation, 
which is due to p being assumed to be true in all interpretations of A.
The problem with recursion through M. In addition to the problem of unintended world views due to recursion through
K, the approaches of Gelfond [14,13] also suffer from the problem of unintended world views due to recursion through M. 
Consider the logic program  = {p ←Mp}, which expresses that for any world view A and any I ∈A, if p is true in some 
answer set in A, then p is true in I . This amounts to saying that if p is true in some answer set, then p is always true, in 
particular in every answer set. Under the approaches of Gelfond [14,13] this program has two world views, {{p}} and {∅}. 
Naturally, the question is whether both are intuitive; ideally, we have only one world view. If, for example, p expresses 
“something goes wrong,” then the program could be viewed as a paraphrase of Murphy’s law: “if something can go wrong, 
it will go wrong,” and accordingly, the intuitive world view would be {{p}}.
Recent advance. Recent work of Kahl et al. [19,18] and del Cerro et al. [4] suggests that indeed {{p}} should be the only 
world view of the program  = {p ← Mp}. The supporting intuition is twofold. First, there seems no justiﬁcation that this 
program has two world views, one derived from treating the modal literal Mp to be true and the other from treating it false. 
Second, Kahl et al. [18] observed that there is a preference order over Kp, p and Mp in terms of the degree of conviction 
in establishing them w.r.t. a world view A: in order to establish Kp, it must be demonstrated that p belongs to all answer 
sets in A; to establish p, it must be demonstrated that p belongs to a particular answer set in A; and to establish Mp, it 
is suﬃcient to demonstrate that p belongs to some answer set in A. This means Kp is of the highest conviction and thus 
is harder to establish than p that is harder than Mp that is of the lowest conviction. Then, intuitively stronger literals are 
expected to be established from or supported by weaker ones, i.e., Kp can be supported by p that can be supported by 
Mp without incurring epistemic circular justiﬁcations. This suggests that the case that some object literal L being true in a 
particular answer set I ∈A is due to ML (or its equivalent modal literals expressing that L is true in some answer set J ∈A) 
being treated true in the program transformation for the modal reduct of  w.r.t. A does not make an epistemic circular 
justiﬁcation. Kahl et al. [18] then used this intuition to justify {{p}} to be a world view of the logic program {p ← Mp}, 
where p is supported by Mp.
In fact, Kahl et al. [19,18] extensively studied the problems of unintended world views due to recursion through K and
M with the approaches of Gelfond [14,13] and proposed a new program transformation by appealing to nested expressions
deﬁned by Lifschitz et al. [22]. Let  be a logic program with rules of form (1) and A a collection of interpretations 
as an assumption. The Kahl modal reduct A of  w.r.t. A is a nested logic program (i.e., a logic program with nested 
expressions), which is obtained from  by replacing all modal literals or deleting rules according to Table 1. The assumption 
A is deﬁned to be a world view of  if it coincides with the collection of answer sets of the nested logic program A under 
the semantics of Lifschitz et al. [22].
Kahl [19] collected sixty-two interesting logic programs with modal literals and illustrated the approach with these 
programs. As a typical example, given an assumption A = {∅}, the Kahl modal reduct of the logic program  = {p ← Mp}
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The program transformation deﬁned by Kahl et al. [19,18], where G is a modal lit-
eral in the body of a rule. Note that ¬¬L is a nested expression deﬁned by Lifschitz 
et al. [22], which is not equivalent to L as in classical logic.
G G is true in A Otherwise
KL replace it with L delete the rule
¬KL replace it with  replace it with ¬L
ML replace it with  replace it with ¬¬L
¬ML replace it with ¬L delete the rule
w.r.t. A is A = {p ← ¬¬p}, which has two answer sets ∅ and {p} under the semantics of Lifschitz et al. [22]. Thus {∅} is 
not a world view. Consequently this program has a unique world view {{p}} under the approach of Kahl et al. [19,18].
However, our careful study reveals three critical shortcomings of this approach:
(1) The deﬁnition of the Kahl program transformation/modal reduct looks a bit ad hoc, and the variety of replacements for 
modal literals (see Table 1) lacks a deeper discussion or justiﬁcation.5
(2) It is undesired to transform a logic program into a reduct containing nested expressions. As shown in Shen et al. [29], 
the existing semantics for nested expressions, such as those deﬁned in [22,11,12], suffer from circular justiﬁcations. For 
example, for the logic program  = {p ← ¬¬p}, I = {p} is an answer set under these semantics. Observe that this 
answer set has a circular justiﬁcation via the self-supporting loop
p ∈ I ⇐ ¬¬p ⇐ p ∈ I (3)
i.e., p being true in I is due to I satisfying ¬¬p (via the rule p ← ¬¬p), which in turn is due to p being true in I .6
For a logic program with rules of form (1), it is desirable to transform it to a regular disjunctive logic program so that 
the standard answer set semantics by Gelfond and Lifschitz [16,17] can be applied.
(3) We observe that applying the Kahl program transformation to some logic programs with recursion through M may also 
produce unintended world views, as illustrated in the following example.
Example 1. Consider the following logic program, which is borrowed from Example 29 in Appendix D of Kahl [19]:
: p ←Mq ∧¬q r1
q ←Mp ∧¬p r2
This program is very similar to {p ← Mp} in the way that the modal operator M is used to recursively support the rule 
heads. Under the approaches of Gelfond [14,13] this program has two world views, viz. A1 = {{p}, {q}} and A2 = {∅}, where 
A1 is derived from treating Mp and Mq to be true and A2 derived from treating them false.
Following the same intuition of Kahl et al. [19,18] for {p ←Mp} as described above, A1 is expected to be the only world 
view of this program. However, applying the Kahl program transformation to this program will produce the two world views 
A1 and A2.
Our contributions. The goal of this paper is to address the above problems of unintended world views and provide a 
satisfactory solution to epistemic negation as well as epistemic speciﬁcations of Gelfond [13]. Our main contributions are 
summarized as follows:
(1) We use modal operator not to directly express epistemic negation and deﬁne general logic programs consisting of rules 
of the form H ← B , where H and B are arbitrary ﬁrst-order formulas possibly containing epistemic negation. Modal 
formulas KF and MF are viewed as shorthands for ¬ not F and not¬F , respectively, and thus epistemic speciﬁcations 
of Gelfond [13] are a special class of general logic programs.
(2) We propose to apply epistemic negation to minimize the knowledge in world views of a general logic program , i.e., 
we apply epistemic negation to arbitrary closed ﬁrst-order formulas F w.r.t. a world view and assume not F in  to be 
true in the world view whenever possible; we refer to this idea as knowledge minimization with epistemic negation. It is 
analogous to applying default negation to minimize the knowledge in answer sets, i.e., one applies default negation to 
arbitrary ground atoms A w.r.t. an answer set and assumes ¬A to be true in the answer set whenever possible (CWA 
or minimal models); this is referred to as knowledge minimization with default negation. To this end, we introduce a novel 
and very simple program transformation based on epistemic negation and present a new deﬁnition of world views. 
5 In fact, no existing approaches to epistemic speciﬁcations, such as those of Gelfond [13,14], Truszczynski [33], and Kahl et al. [19,18], have ever provided 
a deeper discussion or justiﬁcation for the replacements of modal literals in their program transformations.
6 Note the difference between a circular justiﬁcation of form (3), which says that p being true in an answer set I is due to p being assumed to be true 
in I , and an epistemic circular justiﬁcation of form (2), which says that p being true in some answer set I of a world view A (i.e., ∃I∈A p ∈ I) is due to p
being assumed to be true in every answer set I in A (i.e., ∀I∈A p ∈ I).
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on , denoted  , by replacing every not F with  if it is in , and with ¬F , otherwise. Let A be the set of all answer 
sets of  . Then we call A a candidate world view w.r.t.  if it agrees with  in the sense that every not F in  is true 
in A if it is in , and false, otherwise. A candidate world view A w.r.t. a guess  is deﬁned to be a world view under 
our approach if  is maximal, i.e., there is no other candidate world view A′ w.r.t. a guess ′ ⊃ . Note that it is by 
applying a maximal guess  that we realize knowledge minimization with epistemic negation. Obviously, our deﬁnitions 
of program transformations and world views fundamentally differ from those of Gelfond [13,14], and Kahl et al. [19,18].
(3) The approaches of Gelfond [13,14] are said to suffer from the problem with recursion through M because they yield for 
the logic program  = {p ← Mp} two world views, viz. A1 = {{p}} and A2 = {∅}; however, although Kahl et al. [18]
presented a preference order over Kp, p and Mp as an intuitive justiﬁcation, to the best of our knowledge there 
has been no deeper discussion or principled justiﬁcation in the literature on why A1 is the right world view of this 
program and A2 is not. In fact, there has been no formal characterization of the problem with recursion through M
in the literature [14,33,19,18,4]. In this paper, we provide a formal deﬁnition of this problem in terms of knowledge 
minimization with epistemic negation and show that our approach to evaluating epistemic negation is free of both the 
problem of unintended world views due to recursion through K and the problem due to M.
(4) The proposed approach to evaluating epistemic negation can be used to extend any existing answer set semantics 
with epistemic negation, such as those semantics deﬁned in [26,27,32,1,8,12,29]. For illustration, we extend as a simple 
showcase the well-known FLP semantics of Faber et al. [8], yielding a new semantics called epistemic FLP semantics. We 
also extend the more restrictive well-justiﬁed FLP semantics of Shen et al. [29], which is free of circularity for default 
negation, to an epistemic well-justiﬁed semantics.
(5) As satisﬁability of an arbitrary general logic program is undecidable, we address the computational complexity of epis-
temic FLP semantics for propositional programs. In particular, we show that deciding whether a propositional program 
 has epistemic FLP answer sets is p3 -complete. Furthermore, we show that query evaluation, i.e., deciding whether a 
propositional formula is true in every epistemic FLP answer set of some world view of , is p4 -complete in general; 
important fragments, e.g. programs that match normal epistemic speciﬁcations, have lower complexity.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce a ﬁrst-order logic language and deﬁne logic programs with 
ﬁrst-order formulas and epistemic negation. In Section 3 we present a novel program transformation and deﬁne epistemic 
reducts. In Section 4 we present a general framework for deﬁning epistemic answer set semantics. As a simple showcase of 
this general semantics, in Section 5 we extend FLP answer set semantics with epistemic negation and study in depth the 
computational complexity of the extended semantics. In Section 6 we extend the well-justiﬁed FLP semantics with epistemic 
negation. In Section 7 we discuss related work, and in Section 8 we conclude with some future work.
In order not to distract from the ﬂow of reading, proofs of theorems are in the appendix.
2. Preliminaries
In this section, we introduce a ﬁrst-order logic language and deﬁne logic programs with ﬁrst-order formulas and epis-
temic negation.
In the sequel, for a set S , |S| denotes the number of elements in S; for two sets I and J , I ⊆ J or J ⊇ I denotes I is a 
subset of J ; in particular, I ⊂ J or J ⊃ I denotes I is a proper subset of J .
2.1. A ﬁrst-order logic language
We follow the notation in [29] and deﬁne a ﬁrst-order logic language L with equality over a signature  = (P,F), 
where P and F are countable sets of predicate and function symbols, respectively; C ⊆F denotes the set of 0-ary function 
symbols, which are called constants. Variables, terms, atoms and literals are deﬁned as usual. We denote variables with strings 
starting with X , Y or Z .
First-order formulas (brieﬂy formulas) are constructed as usual from atoms using connectives ¬, ∧, ∨, ⊃, , ⊥, ∃ and 
∀, where  and ⊥ are two 0-place logical connectives expressing true and false, respectively. Formulas are closed if they 
contain no free variables, i.e., each variable occurrence is in the scope of some quantiﬁer. A ﬁrst-order theory (or theory) is a 
set of closed formulas. Terms, atoms and formulas are ground if they have no variables, and propositional if they contain no 
variables, no function symbols except constants, and no equalities. By N we denote the set of all ground terms of , and 
by H the set of all ground atoms.
In this paper we consider SNA interpretations, i.e., interpretations which employ the well-known standard names assump-
tion (SNA) [3,24]. An SNA interpretation (or interpretation for short) I of L is a subset of H such that for any ground 
atom A, I satisﬁes A if A ∈ I , and I satisﬁes ¬A if A ∈ I . The notion of satisfaction/models of a formula/theory in I is deﬁned 
as usual. A theory T is consistent or satisﬁable if T has a model. We say that T entails a closed formula F , denoted T |= F , 
if all models of T are models of F . Furthermore F is true (resp. false) in an interpretation I if I satisﬁes (resp. does not 
satisfy) F .
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Based on the ﬁrst-order logic language L deﬁned above, we introduce the syntax of a logic program with epistemic 
negation and deﬁne its grounding, satisfaction and models.
2.2.1. Syntax
As in [29] and early AI literature, default negation will be expressed by giving the connective ¬ a special meaning; i.e., 
we use ¬ to denote the default negation operator. We further extend the language L to include the epistemic negation 
operator not and the rule operator ←.
Epistemic formulas are constructed from atoms using the connectives ¬, ∧, ∨, ⊃, , ⊥, ∃, ∀ together with the operator 
not in the same way as ﬁrst-order formulas. An epistemic negation is an epistemic formula of the form not F , where F is 
an epistemic formula; it is non-nested if F contains no epistemic negation, and nested, otherwise. An epistemic formula is 
closed if it contains no free variables.
Let E be an epistemic formula and E ′ be E with every free variable replaced by a constant (this process is called 
grounding). E is instance-closed (w.r.t. epistemic negation) if for every epistemic negation not F in E ′ , F itself is a closed 
epistemic formula. For instance, person(X) ∧not guilty(X) is an instance-closed epistemic formula, as when the free variable 
X is replaced by a constant, the epistemic negation not guilty(X) will become closed; however, ∀X(person(X) ∧notguilty(X))
is not instance-closed because X is not a free variable and the epistemic negation not guilty(X) will not become closed after 
grounding.
We use instance-closed epistemic formulas to construct rules and logic programs.
Deﬁnition 1 (General logic program). A general logic program (logic program for short) is a ﬁnite set of rules of the form 
H ← B , where H and B are instance-closed epistemic formulas without nested epistemic negations.
Note that like the approaches of Gelfond [14] and Kahl et al. [18], where modal operators K and M are not nested in 
logic programs, we do not consider logic programs with nested epistemic negations (not is also a modal operator); a nested 
epistemic negation like not(not F ) intuitively expresses “That F cannot be proved to be true cannot be proved to be true” 
and such expressions seem to have rare applications in practical scenarios.
For convenience, for a rule r : H ← B we refer to B and H as the body and head of r, denoted body(r) and head(r), 
respectively. When head(r) is empty, we rewrite the rule as ⊥ ← body(r); when body(r) is empty, we omit the rule operator 
←.
Deﬁnition 2 (Normal epistemic program). A normal epistemic program is a logic program consisting of rules of the form
A0 ← A1 ∧ . . . ∧ Am ∧ not Am+1 ∧ . . . ∧ not An (4)
where n ≥m ≥ 0 and each Ai is an atom without equality and function symbols except constants.
Furthermore, as usual a normal logic program consists of rules of the above form (4) except that epistemic negation not
is replaced by default negation ¬; a positive logic program is a ¬-free normal logic program.
Deﬁnition 3 (Propositional program). A propositional program  is a logic program which contains no variables, no function 
symbols except constants, and no equalities. The Herbrand base of  is deﬁned as usual. Any subset of the Herbrand base is 
a Herbrand interpretation of .
2.2.2. Grounding
In a logic program , some rules may contain free variables. In ASP, these free variables will be instantiated by constants 
from a ﬁnite set − usually the set C of constants occurring in . Without loss of generality, we assume that C consists 
of all constants in  (in case that some constant a of the domain does not appear in , we may have it by adding to  a 
dummy rule p(a) ← p(a)). Then for any logic program , C is unique.
A closed instance of a rule is the rule with all free variables replaced by constants in C . The grounding of , denoted 
ground(), is the set of all closed instances of all rules in .
Note that each rule H ← B with the set S of free variables may also be viewed as a globally universally quantiﬁed rule 
∀S(H ← B), where the domain of each variable in S is C while the domain of the other (locally quantiﬁed) variables 
is N . Only globally universally quantiﬁed variables will be instantiated over their domain C for the grounding ground().
To sum up, a logic program  is viewed as shorthand for ground(), where each free variable in  is viewed as 
shorthand for constants in C .
As rule bodies and heads in  are instance-closed epistemic formulas, for every epistemic negation not F in ground(), 
F itself is a closed epistemic formula. Therefore, in the sequel unless otherwise stated, for any epistemic negation not F we 
assume F is a closed epistemic formula.
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Next, we extend the satisfaction relation of L to logic programs. As epistemic negation works at a meta level over a 
collection of interpretations, the deﬁnition of satisfaction/models of epistemic formulas should be based on a collection of 
interpretations.
Deﬁnition 4. Let A be a collection of interpretations and I ∈A.
(1) Let F be a closed formula. Then not F is true in A (or A satisﬁes not F ) if F is false in some J ∈A, and false, otherwise. 
Furthermore I satisﬁes not F w.r.t. A if not F is true in A.
(2) I satisﬁes a closed epistemic formula E w.r.t. A if I satisﬁes E as in ﬁrst-order logic except that the satisfaction of 
epistemic negations in E is determined by (1).
(3) I satisﬁes a closed instance r of a rule w.r.t. A if I satisﬁes head(r) w.r.t. A once I satisﬁes body(r) w.r.t. A.
(4) A is a collection of models of a logic program  if every J ∈ A satisﬁes all rules in ground() w.r.t. A. In this case, 
every J ∈A is a model of  (w.r.t. A). The program  is consistent if it has a model.
Observe the following properties of satisfaction of a logic program .
First, when  contains no epistemic negation, satisfaction in Deﬁnition 4 reduces to that in ﬁrst-order logic. In this case, 
we omit A. Then I satisﬁes a closed rule instance r if I satisﬁes head(r) or I does not satisfy body(r), and I is a model of 
 if it satisﬁes all rules in ground(); moreover, a model I is minimal if  has no model J that is a proper subset of I .
Second, satisfaction of an epistemic negation not F in I w.r.t. A is determined only by A, i.e., I can be ignored.
Finally, when A consists of a single interpretation I , the notions of satisfaction, models and consistency are the same as 
in ﬁrst-order logic, i.e., they are determined only by I and A can be ignored. In this special case, the epistemic negation 
operator not coincides with the operator ¬, i.e., I satisﬁes not F w.r.t. A iff I satisﬁes ¬F iff F is false in I , where F is a 
closed formula. Hence the following proposition is immediate.
Proposition 1. Let  be a logic program and ¬ be  with all epistemic negations not F replaced by default negations ¬F . For any 
interpretation I , A = {I} is a collection of models of  iff I is a model of ¬ .
The following theorem is important, as it lays a theoretical basis for the introduction of our novel program transforma-
tion, which is described in the next section.
Theorem 1. Let  be a logic program such that for every not F in ground(), F is true in every model of . Let ¬ be  with each 
epistemic negation not F replaced by default negation ¬F . Then  and ¬ have the same models.
3. Program transformation and epistemic reducts
In ASP, it is common to transform a logic program into a reduct which is free of negation or modal operators. For 
instance, for a normal logic program , the seminal GL-reduct I w.r.t. a given interpretation I is obtained from ground()
by removing ﬁrst all rules whose bodies contain a default negation ¬A with A ∈ I , and then all ¬A from the remaining 
rules [16]. Similarly, when  is a logic program extended with modal operators K and M, Gelfond [13,14], Truszczynski [33]
and Kahl [19] deﬁned a transformation w.r.t. a given set A of interpretations by eliminating/replacing all modal literals in 
ground() in terms of whether or not they are true in A.
Note that these existing deﬁnitions of program transformations are based on an assumption, which is either a given 
interpretation or a given set of interpretations, and default negations or modal literals in a logic program are evaluated 
against the assumption.
In this paper we aim to apply epistemic negation to minimize the knowledge in a world view of a general logic program 
 by assuming every epistemic negation not F in  to be true in the world view whenever possible. To this end, we deﬁne 
program transformations in an alternative way, which is based on an assumption that is a given set of epistemic negations, 
instead of a given set of interpretations.
Deﬁnition 5. For a logic program , let Ep() denote the set of all epistemic negations not F in ground(). A guess of 
epistemic negations for  is a subset  of Ep().
Intuitively for every not F ∈ , it is guessed that F couldn’t be proved true, and for every not F ∈ Ep() \, it is guessed 
that F would be proved true. Recall that an epistemic negation not F expresses that there is no evidence proving that F is 
true, where F is proved true if it is true in every answer set of some world view.
Once a guess  is given, we can transform program  by replacing all epistemic negations in terms of . There would 
be different replacements for epistemic negations, which would lead to different program transformations. The simplest 
yet naive one is to replace not F with  if not F ∈ , and with ⊥, otherwise. It turns out that this transformation incurs 
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analogously to the cases in [13].
The key idea of our program transformation is as follows. We ﬁrst assume that the guess on all not F ∈  is correct and 
thus replace them with . Then, for every not F ∈ Ep() \ , instead of replacing it with ⊥, we replace it with ¬F . The 
intuition and rationale for the latter replacement is as follows: if  is a correct guess, once all epistemic negations not F ∈ 
in ground() are replaced with , which leads to a new program  , for every not F in  , the formula F is supposed 
to be true in every answer set of . Let  be  with each not F replaced by ¬F ; then by Theorem 1, where model is 
analogously replaced by answer set, we expect that  and  have the same answer sets. This rational justiﬁcation of the 
replacements for epistemic negations leads to the following novel program transformation.
Deﬁnition 6 (Epistemic reducts). Let  be a logic program and let  ⊆ EP() be a guess of epistemic negations for . The 
epistemic reduct  of  w.r.t.  is obtained from ground() by replacing every not F ∈  with , and every not F ∈
Ep() \  with ¬F . We call  consistent w.r.t.  if  is consistent.
In the Introduction we mentioned that a world view A is said to have an epistemic circular justiﬁcation if some object 
literal L being true in some interpretation I ∈A is due to KL (or its equivalent modal literals expressing that L is true in 
every interpretation J ∈A) being treated true in the program transformation w.r.t. A. In our language, KL is shorthand for 
¬ not L, and in our program transformation w.r.t. a guess , ¬ not L will be either treated ¬ (when not L ∈ ), which 
evaluates to false, or treated ¬¬L (when not F ∈ Ep() \ ), which evaluates to L. This means that our deﬁnition of the 
program transformation would never incur epistemic circular justiﬁcations and thus guarantees that world views based on 
the epistemic reducts will be free of the problem with recursion through K.
4. A general epistemic answer set semantics
Now that all epistemic negations have been removed from a logic program , leading to an epistemic reduct  w.r.t. a 
guess , we can apply any answer set semantics for logic programs without epistemic negation to compute all answer sets 
A of  . For A to be a world view, it must agree with the guess , i.e., every not F ∈  is true and every not F ∈ Ep() \
is false in A; it should also satisfy the property of knowledge minimization with epistemic negation, as deﬁned below.
Deﬁnition 7. A world view A of a logic program  is said to have the property of knowledge minimization with epistemic 
negation if A satisﬁes a maximal set  of epistemic negations in Ep() (i.e., no other world view satisﬁes a set ′ ⊃  of 
epistemic negations in Ep()).
In this section, we present a general framework for deﬁning epistemic answer set semantics, thus called a general epis-
temic answer set semantics, which is applicable to extend any existing answer set semantics with epistemic negation.
Deﬁnition 8 (General epistemic semantics). Let  be a logic program and let  be a guess such that  is a consistent 
epistemic reduct. Let X be an answer set semantics for logic programs without epistemic negation. The collection A of 
all answer sets of  under X is a candidate world view of  w.r.t.  if (a) A = ∅, (b) every not F ∈  is true in A, and 
(c) every not F ∈ Ep() \  is false in A. A candidate world view A w.r.t. a guess  is a world view if  is maximal (i.e., 
there is no other candidate world view w.r.t. a guess ′ ⊃ ).
The condition “ is maximal” implies that world views under the general epistemic semantics have the property of 
knowledge minimization with epistemic negation.
In this paper, when we say that a formula F is true in a logic program , we mean that F is proved true in . Recall 
that a formula is proved true if it is true in every answer set of some world view. Therefore, we deﬁne the following form 
of query evaluation.7
Deﬁnition 9 (Query evaluation). Let  be a logic program and F a closed formula. We say F is true in  under the general 
epistemic semantics if  has a world view A such that F is true in every answer set in A.
Now we are ready to introduce the following formal deﬁnition of the problem of unintended world views with recursion 
through M, which was informally described in the Introduction.
Deﬁnition 10 (The problem with recursion through M). An epistemic answer set semantics is said to have the problem of 
unintended world views due to recursion through M if its world views do not satisfy the property of knowledge minimization 
with epistemic negation.
7 Depending on different applications, one could explore other forms of query evaluation, such as: a closed formula F is true if it is true in every answer 
set of every world view.
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through M fails to make full use of the epistemic negations not F occurring in a logic program to minimize the knowledge 
by allowing these epistemic negations to be true in world views whenever possible. This will be further illustrated in 
Example 6.
Obviously, our general epistemic answer set semantics is free of the problem with recursion through M.
Remark 1. We stress that default negation and epistemic negation are used to minimize the knowledge at the answer set
level and the world view level, respectively, and the notion of positive knowledge to be minimized at the answer set level is 
different from that at the world view level. At the answer set level, where default negation ¬ is used, any ground atom is the 
positive knowledge to be minimized in answer sets; but at the world view level, where epistemic negation not is used, any 
closed (ﬁrst-order) formula is the positive knowledge to be minimized in world views. Speciﬁcally, at the answer set level, 
for any ground atom A we assume its default negation ¬A to be true in every answer set whenever possible (knowledge 
minimization with default negation); analogously at the world view level, for any closed formula F we assume its epistemic 
negation not F occurring in a logic program to be true in every world view whenever possible (knowledge minimization 
with epistemic negation). As a result, by applying default negation we minimize the knowledge in every answer set, and by 
applying epistemic negation we minimize the knowledge in every world view. Since epistemic negation is at a meta level, 
in our approach the minimization with epistemic negation has higher priority and is done before the minimization with 
default negation.
Note that if one intends to apply epistemic negation to a formula F by assuming not F to be true in every world view 
whenever possible, one must explicitly express the epistemic negation not F in a logic program. Thus the following four 
programs
1 = {p ∨ q}
2 = {p ∨ q, p ← notq}
3 = {p ∨ q, q ← not p}
4 = {p ∨ q, p ← notq, q ← not p}
are entirely different and have different world views: 1 has a unique world view {{p}{q}}, 2 has a unique one {{p}}, 3
has a unique one {{q}}, and 4 has two world views {{p}} and {{q}}.
In contrast, for any ground atom A its default negation ¬A is implicitly assumed to be true in every answer set whenever 
possible, whether or not ¬A is present in a logic program. Thus the following four programs
1 = {p ∨ q}
2 = {p ∨ q, p ← ¬q}
3 = {p ∨ q, q ← ¬p}
4 = {p ∨ q, p ← ¬q, q ← ¬p}
have the same answer sets {p} and {q} under the existing answer set semantics deﬁned in [17,26,27,32,1,8,12,29].
5. FLP answer set semantics with epistemic negation
The general framework of Deﬁnition 8 is applicable to extend any existing answer set semantics, such as those deﬁned in 
[26,27,32,1,8,12,29], with epistemic negation; as a simple showcase, we extend in this section the well-known FLP answer 
set semantics of Faber et al. [8] to logic programs with epistemic negation. The FLP semantics coincides with the stable 
model respectively answer set semantics for normal and disjunctive logic programs in [16,17], and can be regarded as a 
base semantics for extensions of logic programs beyound aggregates [6]. The following deﬁnition is from Shen et al. [29], 
which lifts Faber et al.’s FLP semantics to general logic programs without epistemic negation.
Deﬁnition 11. Let  be a logic program without epistemic negation and I an interpretation. The FLP-reduct of  w.r.t. I is 
fI = {r ∈ ground() | I satisﬁes body(r)}, and I is an FLP answer set of  if I is a minimal model of fI .
By replacing X with FLP in Deﬁnition 8, we obtain an epistemic FLP answer set semantics (EFLP semantics for short).
Deﬁnition 12 (EFLP semantics). Let  be a logic program and  a guess such that  is a consistent epistemic reduct. 
The collection A of all FLP answer sets of  is a candidate world view, resp. a world view, of  w.r.t.  if A satisﬁes the 
conditions of Deﬁnition 8. Every FLP answer set in a world view is called an EFLP answer set.
Obviously, for logic programs without epistemic negation, Ep() = ∅ and EFLP semantics reduces to FLP semantics.
The following result shows that EFLP answer sets of  are models of .
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Let  be a normal epistemic program and ¬ be the normal logic program obtained from  by replacing epistemic 
negation not with default negation ¬. Let I be an interpretation and (¬)I be the GL-reduct of ¬; then I is a standard 
answer set of ¬ if I is the least model of (¬)I [16].
The following result shows that answer sets of a normal epistemic program  under EFLP semantics coincide with those 
of ¬ under the standard answer set semantics.
Theorem 3. Let  be a normal epistemic program and let ¬ be the normal logic program obtained from  by replacing not with ¬. 
Then (1) every world view A of  fulﬁlls |A| = 1 (i.e., A is a singleton), and (2) A = {I} is a world view of  iff I is an FLP answer set 
of ¬ iff I is a standard answer set of ¬.
Next we consider a few simple examples to illustrate the novelty and suitability of our approach. Interested readers may 
apply the approach to more examples collected in [19,18].
Example 2. The following logic program uses epistemic negation to formalize the well-known presumption of innocence:
1: innocent(John) ∨ guilty(John) r1
innocent(X) ← not guilty(X) r2
Rule r1 says that John is either innocent or guilty, and rule r2 asserts that one is presumed innocent if there is no evi-
dence proving s/he is guilty. From this program we intend to arrive at the conclusion that John is innocent; speciﬁcally, 
innocent(John) is expected to be in every answer set of every world view of 1.
The grounding of 1 is
ground(1): innocent(John) ∨ guilty(John) r1
innocent(John) ← not guilty(John) r′2
It contains only one epistemic negation, thus Ep(1) = {notguilty(John)}. So we have two guesses: 1 = {not guilty(John)}
and 2 = ∅.
We start with the largest guess 1 and check if there is a world view w.r.t. 1. Note Ep(1) \ 1 = ∅. The epistemic 
reduct w.r.t. 1 is

1
1 : innocent(John) ∨ guilty(John) r1
innocent(John) ←  r′′2

1
1 is consistent and has a unique FLP answer set I = {innocent(John)}. Let A = {I}. As guilty(John) is false in I , 
notguilty(John) is true in A, thus A is a candidate world view of 1. Since 1 is the largest guess, A is a world view 
of 1 w.r.t. 1.
As 2 ⊂ 1, there would be no world view w.r.t. 2. Hence, 1 has only one world view A = {{innocent(John)}}. 
Therefore, the formula innocent(John) is true in 1, meaning that John is innocent. This conforms to our expectation.
Example 3. To demonstrate the necessity of epistemic reasoning with epistemic negation, Gelfond [13] introduced the 
well-known college scholarship awarding problem with the following logic program:
2: eligible(X) ← highGPA(X) r1
eligible(X) ←minority(X) ∧ fairGPA(X) r2
∼ eligible(X) ← lowGPA(X) r3
interview(X) ← ¬eligible(X) ∧ ¬∼eligible(X) r4
fairGPA(Mike) ∨ highGPA(Mike) r5
Gelfond argued that Mike was intended to be interviewed, i.e., interview(Mike) should be included in every answer set of 
2; however, he observed that the fourth rule r4 was not powerful enough to formalize the intended statement that the 
students whose eligibility is not determined by the college rules should be interviewed by the scholarship committee. It 
was due to this observation that Gelfond [13,14] proposed his modal formalism in which r4 was replaced by the rule
interview(X) ← ¬K eligible(X) ∧¬K∼eligible(X).
Next, we show that this problem can be suitably handled using epistemic negation under EFLP semantics. As shown in 
[17], for any atom p(X), the strong negation ∼p(X) can be compiled away by introducing a fresh predicate p′(X) along 
with a rule ⊥ ← p(X) ∧ p′(X). We formulate the above problem by rewriting 2 by replacing ¬ with not and ∼eligible(X)
with eligible′(X), and adding the rule ⊥ ← eligible(X) ∧ eligible′(X); this yields a new program ′ with the grounding2
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eligible(Mike) ← minority(Mike) ∧ fairGPA(Mike) r′2
eligible′(Mike) ← lowGPA(Mike) r′3
interview(Mike) ← not eligible(Mike) ∧ not eligible′(Mike) r′4
fairGPA(Mike) ∨ highGPA(Mike) r5
⊥ ← eligible(Mike) ∧ eligible′(Mike) r6
Ep(′2) = {not eligible(Mike), not eligible′(Mike)}, so there are four guesses. We start with the largest guess 1 ={not eligible(Mike), not eligible′(Mike)} and check if ′2 has a world view w.r.t. 1.
The epistemic reduct ′12 w.r.t. 1 is ground(′2) except that r′4 is replaced by the rule
interview(Mike) ← ∧ r′′4

′1
2 is consistent and has the following two FLP answer sets:
I1 = {fairGPA(Mike), interview(Mike)}
I2 = {highGPA(Mike), eligible(Mike), interview(Mike)}
Let A = {I1, I2}. As eligible(Mike) and eligible′(Mike) are both false in I1, both not eligible(Mike) and not eligible′(Mike) are 
true in A. As Ep(′2) \ 1 = ∅ and 1 is the largest guess, A is a unique world view of ′2.
Note that interview(Mike) appears in every answer set in A and thus is true in this logic program. Therefore, Mike should 
be interviewed, as we expected.
Remark 2. We can also formulate the above problem without using strong negation by rewriting 2 with ¬ replaced by 
not, and ∼ by ¬; thus r4 is rewritten as
interview(X) ← not eligible(X) ∧ not¬eligible(X).
This rule directly expresses that a student should be interviewed if we can neither prove s/he is eligible nor not eligible. 
Then, the grounding of the new program consists of r′1, r′2, r5, and the following two rules:
¬eligible(Mike) ← lowGPA(Mike) r¬3
interview(Mike) ← not eligible(Mike) ∧ not¬eligible(Mike) r¬4
It is easy to check that this new program has a unique world view A = {I1, I2} w.r.t. the largest guess 1 =
{not eligible(Mike), not¬eligible(Mike)}, where
I1 = {fairGPA(Mike), interview(Mike)}
I2 = {highGPA(Mike), eligible(Mike), interview(Mike)}
which shows that Mike should be interviewed, as expected.
Example 4 (Closed world rules). Under EFLP semantics, we can directly formulate the closed world assumption using closed 
world rules of the form ¬p ← not p, which expresses that when failing to prove p to be true, we assert ¬p. Moreover, we 
can also state its opposite using rules of the form p ← not¬p, which expresses that when failing to prove ¬p to be true, 
we assert p. We can further combine them, leading to the following interesting logic program.
: ¬p ← not p r1
p ← not¬p r2
It is easy to check that this program has two world views: A1 = {∅} w.r.t. the guess 1 = {not p} and A2 = {{p}} w.r.t. 
2 = {not¬p}. This conforms to our intuition that either ¬p or p can be concluded from , depending on whether we 
choose to apply CWA on p (rule r1) or on ¬p (rule r2).
Remark 3. Gelfond and Lifschitz [17] used a rule ∼p ← ¬p (instead of ¬p ← not p) to formalize CWA on an atom p, which 
achieves the effect that if p is not in an answer set I , then ∼p is in I . As indicated by Gelfond [13], this formalization of 
CWA is problematic. For example, by this formalization the logic program  = {p ∨ q} extended with the rule ∼p ← ¬p
would have two answer sets, viz. I1 = {∼p, q} and I2 = {p}; thus both p and q are unknown in  under the semantics of 
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view {{q}} under EFLP semantics, so p is false and q is true in , as expected.9
Example 5. Let  = {r ← not p ∧¬r, p ← ¬q, q ← ¬p}. Intuitively, the last two rules say that either {p} or {q} is an answer 
set of , and the ﬁrst rule is a constraint that every answer set of  should contain p. Therefore,  intuitively should have 
a unique answer set {p}. It is easy to check that under EFLP semantics this program has a unique world view A = {{p}}
w.r.t. the guess  = ∅. Note that A is not a world view under the approach of Gelfond [14], where not p in  is replaced 
by ¬Kp.
Example 6. Consider again the logic program  = {p ← Mp}. As mentioned earlier, Mp is shorthand for not¬p, so this 
program can be rewritten as  = {p ← not¬p}. The set  = {not¬p} is the largest guess and it is easy to check that {{p}}
is a unique world view of  w.r.t.  under EFLP semantics.
Similarly, the logic program in Example 1 can be rewritten as
: p ← not¬q ∧¬q r1
q ← not¬p ∧¬p r2
It has a unique world view A = {{p}, {q}} w.r.t. the guess  = {not¬q, not¬p}. For this program, as shown in Example 1
applying the approaches of Gelfond [13,14], and Kahl et al. [19,18] will produce two world views, including the unintended 
one {∅}.
We remark that our epistemic answer set semantics minimizes the knowledge in world views by requiring that every 
world view should satisfy as many epistemic negations in a logic program as possible. It is this property of knowledge mini-
mization with epistemic negation that provides a principled justiﬁcation for the above two programs on why A1 = {{p}} is the right 
world view and A2 = {∅} is not.
Remark 4. A rule of the form
p ← not¬p (5)
(or p ← Mp) expresses that if there is no evidence to prove ¬p to be true, we conclude p; put another way, we admit 
p unless we prove its contrary. Observe that such rules are commonly used in our daily life and our approach provides 
a suitable solution to such epistemic speciﬁcations. As an interesting example, the well-known Murphy’s law10 says that 
anything that can go wrong, will go wrong; put another way, if something can go wrong and we cannot prove it will not go 
wrong, then it will go wrong. We can conveniently formalize this law by a rule
gowrongUnderMurphylaw(X) ← not¬gowrongUnderMurphylaw(X).
As another close example, our research group has a regular weekly meeting and our secretary Cathy reminds us every 
week by a no-reply email with the assumption that every member in the group will be present unless some notice of 
absence is available. This epistemic assumption can be suitably formalized by a rule of the form
present(X) ← not¬present(X),
i.e., any group member will be present unless we prove the contrary. Then for an individual member John without notice to 
Cathy, we would have a grounding
 = {present(John) ← not¬present(John)}
which has a unique world view {{present(John)}} under EFLP semantics, meaning that John will be present in the meeting.
Example 7. Consider the logic program  = {p ← not p ∨ p}. Note that not p ∨ p is a tautology in that for any collection A
of interpretations, every I ∈A satisﬁes not p ∨ p w.r.t. A. Then p can be inferred by applying the rule p ← not p ∨ p; thus 
 is supposed to have a unique world view A = {{p}}.
This program has two guesses: 1 = {not p} and 2 = ∅. It is easy to check that  has no world view w.r.t. 1, but has 
a world view A = {{p}} w.r.t. 2.
Note that the approaches of Gelfond [13,14] and Kahl et al. [19,18] are not applicable to this program.
Observe that in our logic language L the formula ¬p ∨ p is also a tautology, and p ← ¬p ∨ p is not equivalent to 
{p ← ¬p, p ← p}. Under EFLP semantics the rule p ← not p ∨ p is not equivalent to {p ← not p, p ← p}.
8 Under the semantics of Gelfond and Lifschitz [17], p is true in an answer set I if p ∈ I , false if ∼p ∈ I , and unknown, otherwise. p is true/false in a 
logic program  if it is true/false in all answer sets of , and unknown, otherwise.
9 Alternatively, one might want to extend  with the rule ∼p ← not p. Then ∼p can be compiled away similarly as in Example 3. The resulting program 
′ = {p ∨ q, p′ ← not p, ⊥ ← p ∧ p′} has a unique world view {{q, p′}} under EFLP semantics, meaning p is false and q is true in .
10 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Murphy%27s_law.
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For a logic program , each guess  leads to at most one candidate world view w.r.t. . As there are at most 2|Ep()|
guesses (where |Ep()| is the number of epistemic negations in Ep()),  has at most 2|Ep()| candidate world views. In 
view of the fact that if  has a world view w.r.t.  then it will have no world view w.r.t. any ′ ⊃  or ′ ⊂ , the 
following result is immediate.
Proposition 2. A logic program  has at most 
( n
n/2
)
many world views under EFLP semantics, where n = |Ep()|.
Indeed, 
( n
n/2
)
is the maximal size of an antichain in the powerset lattice of a set of cardinality n [31]. In the two most 
extreme cases that  has a world view w.r.t. , where  = Ep() or  = ∅,  has only one world view.
As the satisﬁability of arbitrary ﬁrst-order theories is undecidable, we only address the computational complexity of EFLP 
answer sets for propositional programs under Herbrand interpretations. Recall that in this case, deciding the existence of 
FLP answer sets of a given logic program  without epistemic negation is p2 -complete [29], where the 
p
2 -hardness is 
inherited from disjunctive logic programs [8,5].
We ﬁrst consider the complexity of recognizing a suitable guess.
Theorem 4. Given a propositional program  and a guess  for it, deciding whether  has a candidate world view w.r.t.  under 
EFLP semantics is Dp2 -complete.
The class Dp2 consists of all problems (P !, P2) whose instances are pairs (I1, I2) of instances I1 of a problem P1 in 
p
2
and I2 of a problem P2 in 
p
2 , respectively.
Informally, we must check the conditions (a)–(c) of a candidate world view in Deﬁnition 8, where (a) establishes a fortiori
also consistency of ; as  is constructible in polynomial time, we can solve (a) and (b) in p2 and (c) in 
p
2 , as deciding 
whether  has some FLP answer set that satisﬁes (resp. does not satisfy) a formula F is in p2 ; thus, the problem is in 
Dp2 . The D
p
2 -hardness is shown by a reduction from deciding whether, given a pair (1, 2) of propositional programs, both 
1 has some FLP-answer set and 2 has no FLP answer set; this problem is D
p
2 -complete. Informally, 2 is modiﬁed to 
a program ′2 whose answer sets amount to those of 2 plus an extra answer set {A}, where A is a fresh atom; to this 
end, we add ¬A in the rule bodies of 2 and guessing clauses A ← ¬ A¯ and A¯ ← ¬A, where A¯ is another fresh atom. The 
program  contains 1 and ′2 and has a candidate world view w.r.t.  = ∅, where EP() = {not A}, just if 1 has some 
FLP answer set and A is true in all FLP answer sets of ′2 (i.e., 2 has no FLP answer set). (For more details, see the proof 
in Appendix A.)
From this result, we obtain that deciding program consistency under candidate world views is at the third level of the 
polynomial hierarchy. More precisely,
Theorem 5. Given a propositional program , deciding whether  has (i) some candidate world view and (ii) some world view, i.e., 
deciding EFLP answer set existence, are both p3 -complete.
Indeed, a guess  ⊆ Ep() such that  has some candidate world view w.r.t.  can be veriﬁed in polynomial time with 
an oracle for Dp2 , and hence also with one for 
p
2 . This places the problem in 
p
3 . The matching 
p
3 -hardness can be shown 
by a reduction from evaluating quantiﬁed Boolean formulas of the form ∃Z∀Y∃Zφ. Informally, epistemic negations not X , 
not X¯ are used to guess an assignment to the X atoms, and some other epistemic negation serves to check that for each 
assignment to the Y atoms, some assignment to Z makes φ true; this test for Y and Z is encoded to cautious reasoning 
from the FLP answer set of a disjunctive logic program, which is p2 -complete [5].
Note that some world view exists iff some candidate world view exists; this justiﬁes the second part of Theorem 5, and 
consistency checking under candidate world view and world view semantics are equally hard. On the other hand, under 
EFLP semantics formula evaluation is harder.
Theorem 6. Given a propositional program  and a propositional formula F , deciding whether F is true in  under EFLP semantics 
(i) w.r.t. candidate world views is p3 -complete and (ii) w.r.t. world views is 
p
4 -complete.
While under candidate world views, it suﬃces to guess  ⊆ EP() such that  has a candidate world view A w.r.t. 
and  cautiously entails F (i.e., F is true in all answer sets of  , which can be checked with an p2 oracle), in case of 
world views under EFLP semantics, in addition maximality of  must be tested, i.e., no ′ ⊃  has some candidate world 
view; this however turns out to be p3 -complete, which lifts the problem to the fourth level of the polynomial hierarchy.
We note that the above results hold for propositional programs that amount to epistemic speciﬁcations, i.e., the rules 
match the syntax of form (1), where KF amounts to ¬ not F and MF to not¬F . In case of normal epistemic speciﬁcations, 
i.e., the rules of form (1) with m = 1, the complexity drops by one level of the polynomial hierarchy, and we obtain Dp1 -, 

p and p-completeness in place of Dp-, p and p-completeness, respectively (for details, see Appendix B). Indeed, as 2 3 2 3 4
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which deciding FLP answer set existence is NP-complete. Furthermore, we remark that similar complexity results can be 
derived for other answer set semantics, and in particular for well-justiﬁed FLP answer sets [29].
6. Epistemic well-justiﬁed answer set semantics
As shown in [29], FLP answer set semantics of Faber et al. [8] also suffers like other existing answer set semantics such 
as those deﬁned in [26,32,1,12] from circular justiﬁcations for some logic programs without epistemic negation. Consider 
the following program:
: p ← q r1
q ← ¬q ∨ p r2
Here I = {p, q} is an FLP answer set of  which has a circular justiﬁcation via the self-supporting loop p ⇐ q ⇐ ¬q ∨ p ⇐ p, 
i.e., p being true in I is due to q being true in I (via rule r1) that is due to I satisfying ¬q ∨ p (via rule r2), which in turn 
is due to p being true in I .
To the best of our knowledge, the well-justiﬁed FLP answer set semantics deﬁned by Shen et al. [29] is the only one in 
the current literature whose answer sets are well justiﬁed by having a level mapping for any general logic programs without 
epistemic negation and thus are free of circular justiﬁcations. It is analogous to the standard answer set semantics of Gelfond 
and Lifschitz [16] for normal logic programs whose answer sets are well justiﬁed by having a level mapping [10]. Therefore, 
in this section we extend the well-justiﬁed FLP semantics to an epistemic one and discuss its relation with EFLP semantics.
The well-justiﬁed FLP semantics is based on the one-step provability operator T(O , N), which is an extension of the 
van Emden–Kowalski one-step provability operator [34] from positive to general logic programs.
Deﬁnition 13. (See [29].) Let  be a logic program without epistemic negation, and let O and N be two ﬁrst-order theories. 
Deﬁne
T(O ,N) = {head(r) | r ∈ ground() and O ∪ N |= body(r)}.
Informally, T(O , N) collects all heads of rules in ground() whose bodies are entailed by O  ∪N . When the parameter N
is ﬁxed, the entailment relation |= is monotone in O , so T(O , N) is monotone w.r.t. O , i.e., for any ﬁrst-order theories O 1 ⊆
O 2, we have T(O 1, N) ⊆ T(O 2, N). Hence the sequence 〈T i(∅, N)〉∞i=0, where T 0(∅, N) = ∅ and for i ≥ 0 T i+1 (∅, N) =
T(T i(∅, N), N), will converge to a least ﬁxpoint, denoted lfp(T(∅, N)).
The well-justiﬁed FLP answer set semantics, abbreviated as WJ semantics, is deﬁned in terms of the least ﬁxpoint 
lfp(T(∅, ¬I−)) of an interpretation I .
Deﬁnition 14. (See [29].) Let I be a model of a logic program  without epistemic negation. Then I is a WJ answer set if 
lfp(T(∅, ¬I−)) ∪¬I− |= A for every A ∈ I .
Then, by replacing X with WJ in Deﬁnition 8 we obtain an epistemic well-justiﬁed answer set semantics (EWJ semantics 
for short).
Deﬁnition 15 (EWJ semantics). Let  be a logic program and  a guess such that  is a consistent epistemic reduct. 
The collection A of all WJ answer sets of  is a candidate world view, resp. a world view, of  w.r.t.  if A satisﬁes the 
conditions of Deﬁnition 8. Every WJ answer set in a world view is called an EWJ answer set.
As an exercise one may check that for the above Examples 2 to 7, their EWJ answer sets are the same as their EFLP 
answer sets.
Note that a WJ answer set of a logic program without epistemic negation must be an FLP answer set, but the converse is 
not true; particularly an FLP answer set is a WJ answer set if and only if it is free of circular justiﬁcations (see Theorem 6 of 
Shen et al. [29]). Not surprisingly, such relations between FLP and WJ semantics do not convey to EFLP and EWJ semantics, 
as illustrated in the following example.
Example 8. Let us ﬁrst consider the following logic program without epistemic negation:
: p ← q ∧¬r r1
q ← ¬q ∨ p ∨ r r2
r ← ¬s r3
s ← ¬r r4
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circular justiﬁcation via the self-supporting loop p ⇐ q ∧ ¬r ⇐ ¬q ∨ p ∨ r ⇐ p, i.e., p being true in I is due to both q and 
¬r being true in I (via r1), where q being true in I is due to I satisfying ¬q ∨ p ∨ r (via r2), which in turn is due to p being 
true in I .
Next let us add to  the following rule:
t ← not r r5
Then this program has a unique world view A1 = {{t, s, p, q}, {r, q}} (w.r.t. the guess  = {not r}) under EFLP semantics, and 
a unique world view A2 = {{r, q}} (w.r.t. the guess  = ∅) under EWJ semantics.
As a result, a world view under EWJ semantics is not necessarily a world view under EFLP semantics, and vise versa. 
However, it is trivial to show that for programs matching normal epistemic speciﬁcations, the world views under EWJ and 
EFLP semantics coincide.
Remark 5. The above example demonstrates that while a semantics X for logic programs without epistemic negation can 
be more restrictive than a semantics Y in the sense that X always yields a subcollection of the answer sets of Y , this 
property will not be warranted when these semantics are extended to logic programs with epistemic negation by applying 
the general framework of Deﬁnition 8.
7. Related work
The need for using epistemic negation in knowledge representation and reasoning was long recognized by Gelfond [13,
15] and recently further emphasized in [14,33,9,35,19,18,4,37]. In particular, Gelfond [13] ﬁrst introduced modal operators K
and M to ASP and interpreted them in three-valued interpretations (called three-valued possible worlds). Formulas with such 
modal operators are called strongly introspective and logic programs with rules of form (1) called epistemic speciﬁcations. 
Truszczynski [33] revisited this formalism and redeﬁned its semantics in two-valued interpretations.
It turns out that the approaches of Gelfond [13] and Truszczynski [33] suffer from the problem of unintended world 
views due to recursion through K, i.e., they incur epistemic circular justiﬁcations for logic programs like  = {p ← Kp}, 
where an unintended world view {{p}} is produced. To remedy this, Gelfond [14] further updated his program transfor-
mation. However, epistemic circular justiﬁcations persist for other logic programs such as  = {q ← ¬Kp, p ← ¬q}, where 
an unintended world view {{p}} is produced when applying the approaches of Gelfond [14,13] and Truszczynski [33]. In 
addition, these approaches also suffer from the problem of unintended world views due to recursion through M for logic 
programs like  = {p ←Mp}, where an unintended world view {∅} is produced.
To address the problems of unintended world views due to recursion through K and M, Kahl et al. [19,18] proposed a 
more involved program transformation by appealing to nested expressions of Lifschitz et al. [22]. However this approach 
has some clear shortcomings as listed in the Introduction. Speciﬁcally, as illustrated in Example 1 this approach also suffers 
from the problem of unintended world views due to recursion through M. Moreover, as shown in Shen et al. [29] answer 
sets of logic programs with nested expressions suffer from circular justiﬁcations under the existing semantics as deﬁned in 
[22,11,12].
In an alternative venue, Wang and Zhang [36] developed epistemic equilibrium models for epistemic speciﬁcations by 
introducing modal operators K and M to Pearce’s equilibrium logic [25,26]. This approach suffers from the problems of 
unintended world views due to recursion through K and M; for example, both {{p}} and {∅} are world views of  =
{p ← Kp} and  = {p ← Mp}. Very recently, del Cerro et al. [4] presented a new deﬁnition of epistemic equilibrium 
models (EEMs) and further deﬁned autoepistemic equilibrium models (AEEMs) as world views that are maximal EEMs under 
set inclusion and a special partial preorder over S5 models. A dozen of logic programs were listed all of which except for 
that program in Example 1 have the AEEMs that coincide with the world views of Kahl [19]; the AEEM of the program 
in Example 1 coincides with the world view under our EFLP semantics. On the one hand, it is unclear whether AEEMs 
are free of unintended world views due to recursion through K and M for general logic programs. On the other hand, as 
discussed by Shen et al. [29], Pearce’s equilibrium semantics coincides with the answer set semantics of Ferraris [11] for 
propositional logic programs and with that of Ferraris [12] in the ﬁrst-order case, and these semantics suffer from circular 
justiﬁcations. Since AEEMs are epistemic extensions of Pearce’s equilibrium models, circular justiﬁcations inevitably convey 
to AEEMs, thus sometimes leading to undesired world views. For example, for the program  = {p ← ¬¬p, p ← ¬p}, {p}
is a unique minimal equilibrium model/answer set under Pearce [26] and thus {{p}} is an AEEM under del Cerro et al. [4]. 
This answer set/world view is undesired because it has a circular justiﬁcation via the self-supporting loop p ⇐ ¬¬p ⇐ p. 
Finally, this approach may miss some desired world views; for instance, {{p}} is expected to be a world view of the program 
 = {p ← not p ∨ p} (see Example 7), but it is not an AEEM of  where not p is replaced by ¬Kp.
Finally, we mention that Lifschitz [20] deﬁned a modal logic of Minimal Knowledge and Negation as Failure (MKNF), which 
has two modal operators, viz. K as deﬁned above and not like our epistemic negation operator. MKNF logic has recently 
been exploited for the integration of description logics and rules in the Semantic Web [24]. As indicated in the end of Lifs-
chitz [20], “MKNF does not cover the important concept of strong introspection introduced in Gelfond [13].” Thus, applying 
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identiﬁed with a logic program P1 consisting of the following formulas:
K innocent(John) ∨ K guilty(John) f1
not guilty(X) ⊃ K innocent(X) f2
Under MKNF, P1 has two possible collections of models (where each is viewed as an S5 structure):
A1 = {{innocent(John)}, {innocent(John),guilty(John)}}
A2 = {{guilty(John)}, {guilty(John), innocent(John)}}
The ﬁrst collection means John is innocent, while the second says John is guilty, which violates our intuition.
8. Summary and future work
We have presented a novel approach to evaluating epistemic negation; speciﬁcally, we proposed to apply epistemic 
negation to minimize the knowledge in world views (knowledge minimization with epistemic negation), introduced a novel 
program transformation based on epistemic negation, and presented a new deﬁnition of epistemic answer set semantics for 
general logic programs. This approach overcomes both the problem of unintended world views due to recursion through K
and the problem due to M, and thus provides an appropriate solution to epistemic speciﬁcations introduced by Gelfond [13]
over two decades ago.
Our approach is applicable to extend with epistemic negation any existing answer set semantics such as those deﬁned 
in [26,27,32,1,8,12,29]. For illustration, we extended FLP answer set semantics of Faber et al. [8] to epistemic FLP semantics. 
We also extended the well-justiﬁed FLP semantics of Shen et al. [29] to an epistemic well-justiﬁed semantics.
We showed that for a propositional program  with epistemic negation, deciding whether  has EFLP answer sets is 

p
3 -complete and deciding whether a propositional formula F is true in  under EFLP semantics is 
p
4 -complete in general, 
but has lower complexity for important program classes, such as logic programs that match normal epistemic speciﬁcations, 
where the complexity of world view existence and query evaluation drops by one level in the polynomial hierarchy.
Reasoning with both epistemic and default negations is powerful in expressiveness, but is expensive in computation. 
Methods for eﬃcient system implementation present a challenging future task. Currently we are considering implementation 
for normal epistemic speciﬁcations; an attractive property of this class of logic programs is that their epistemic reducts 
amount to a normal logic program under FLP or well-justiﬁed FLP semantics, for which deciding answer set existence is 
NP-complete.
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Appendix A. Proofs
Proof of Theorem1. Let A =⋃iAi be the union of all collections Ai of models of ; then A consists of all models of . By 
the condition that for every epistemic negation not F in ground(), F is true in every model of , for every interpretation 
I ∈ A, as I satisﬁes all rules in ground() w.r.t. some Ai , I also satisﬁes these rules w.r.t. A. This means A itself is a 
collection of models of .
For any interpretation I , if AI = {I} is a collection of models of , then I ∈A; conversely, if I ∈A, i.e., I satisﬁes all 
rules in ground() w.r.t. A, then I also satisﬁes these rules w.r.t. AI = {I} and thus AI = {I} is a collection of models of 
. Hence for any interpretation I , AI = {I} is a collection of models of  iff I ∈ A iff I is a model of . Moreover, by 
Proposition 1, for any interpretation I , AI = {I} is a collection of models of  iff I is a model of ¬ . Thus I is a model of 
 iff I is a model of ¬ . This concludes the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 2. Consider an EFLP answer set I ∈A w.r.t. guess . As I is an FLP answer set of the epistemic reduct 
 , it is a model of  . Let 
not
be  with all ¬F replaced by not F . Since for every not F in not , F is true in all 
I ∈A, by Theorem 1, not and  have the same models. This means I is a model of not w.r.t. A. Note that not is 
ground() with every not F ∈  replaced by . Then r is a rule in ground() iff r is a rule in not , where r is r with 
every not F ∈  replaced by . Since for every not F ∈ , F is false in some J ∈A, I satisﬁes r w.r.t. A iff I satisﬁes r
w.r.t. A. This shows I is also a model of ground() w.r.t. A. Hence A is a collection of models of . 
Proof of Theorem 3. (1) Let A be a world view of  w.r.t. a guess . Then A is also the set of all FLP answer sets of the 
epistemic reduct  . Rules in  are of the form
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where every Bi is true in every I ∈A because not Bi ∈ Ep() \. This means  and + have the same set of FLP answer 
sets, where 
+
is  with all rules containing a negative literal ¬Bi removed. Since + is a positive logic program, it 
has a unique FLP answer set. Hence A has only one FLP answer set, i.e., |A| = 1.
(2) For normal logic programs, FLP semantics coincides with the standard answer set semantics. So it suﬃces to show 
that A = {I} is a world view of  iff I is a standard answer set of ¬ .
We ﬁrst show that A = {I} is a candidate world view of  iff I is a standard answer set of ¬ .
(=⇒) Assume A = {I} is a candidate world view of  w.r.t. a guess . Then I is also the FLP answer set of the epistemic 
reduct  , and for every not B in ground(), not B ∈  iff B is false in I iff B ∈ I . Let r be a rule in  . For every negative 
literal ¬Bi in the rule body of r, Bi is true in I , i.e., Bi ∈ I . Let + be  with all rules containing a negative literal 
¬Bi removed. Then I is also the FLP answer set of + , which is the least model of + . Note that + is in fact the 
GL-reduct of ¬ . This means I is also a standard answer set of ¬ .
(⇐=) Assume I is a standard answer set of ¬ . Let  be a guess such that for every not B in ground(), not B ∈  iff 
B is false in I iff B ∈ I . Let r be a rule in ground() such that I satisﬁes body(r) w.r.t. A = {I}. r must be of the form
H ← A1 ∧ . . . ∧ Am ∧ not B1 ∧ . . . ∧ not Bn
with every Ai ∈ I and every Bi ∈ I (i.e., not Bi ∈ ). Then ¬ must have a rule r′ of the form
H ← A1 ∧ . . . ∧ Am ∧¬B1 ∧ . . . ∧¬Bn.
Note that I satisﬁes body(r′). As I is a model of ¬ , H is in I . This means I satisﬁes r w.r.t. A. Hence A = {I} is a candidate 
world view w.r.t. .
We have proved that A = {I} is a candidate world view of  iff I is a standard answer set of ¬ . To show that A = {I}
is a world view of  iff I is a standard answer set of ¬ , it suﬃces to show that every candidate world view of  is a 
world view of .
Assume on the contrary that there are two guesses ′ ⊃  such that A′ = {I ′} and A = {I} are candidate world views 
w.r.t. ′ and , respectively. For each not B ∈ ′ \ , B ∈ I ′ and B ∈ I . This means I ′ = I . By the above proof, I ′ and I are 
standard answer sets of ¬ . We have the following two GL-reducts w.r.t. I ′ and I respectively:
(¬)I ′ = {A0 ← A1 ∧ · · · ∧ Am | A0 ← A1 ∧ · · · ∧ Am ∧¬B1 ∧ · · · ∧ ¬Bn
is a rule in ground(¬) and for every Bi , not Bi is in ′},
(¬)I = {A0 ← A1 ∧ · · · ∧ Am | A0 ← A1 ∧ · · · ∧ Am ∧¬B1 ∧ · · · ∧ ¬Bn
is a rule in ground(¬) and for every Bi , not Bi is in }.
As the two GL-reducts are positive logic programs, I ′ and I are their least ﬁxpoints, respectively. As ′ ⊃ , every rule in 
(¬)I must be in (¬)I ′ . This implies I ⊂ I ′ (I ′ = I , as shown above), which contradicts the fact that every standard answer 
set of a normal logic program is a minimal model of the program. We then conclude the proof. 
Proof of Theorem 4. Membership. The proof of Dp2 membership is in the discussion below Theorem 4.
Hardness. The Dp2 -hardness is shown by the reduction of the D
p
2 -complete problem where, given a pair (1, 2) of 
programs, we must decide whether 1 has some FLP answer set and 2 has no FLP answer set. (This result in turn is 
easily obtained by a reduction of evaluating QBFs of the form ∃X∀Yφ to FLP answer set existence of disjunctive logic 
programs [5].)
Assume w.l.o.g. that 1 and 2 are on disjoint signatures and let A, A¯, C be fresh atoms. Then we claim that
 = 1 ∪ {H ← B ∧¬A | H ← B ∈ 2}
∪ {A ← ¬ A¯, A¯ ← ¬A, C ← not A}
has a candidate world view w.r.t.  = ∅ iff 1 has some FLP answer set and 2 has no FLP answer set. Notice that the 
epistemic reduct is
 = ( \ {C ← not A}) ∪ {C ← ¬A}.
(=⇒) Suppose  has a candidate world view A w.r.t.  = ∅. Then 1 must have an FLP answer set. Furthermore, A
must be true in every FLP answer set of  . In particular, this means that the guess A¯ from A ← A¯, A¯ ← A, does not lead 
to an FLP answer set of ; this means that the program {H ← B ∧¬A | H ← B ∈ 2} has no FLP answer set, from which in 
turn it follows that 2 has no FLP answer set.
(⇐=) For each FLP answer set I1 of 1, the set I1 ∪ {A} is an FLP answer set of  , and if since 2 has no FLP answer 
set, each answer set in the collection A of FLP answer sets of  has this form. As 1 has some FLP answer set I1, it 
follows that A = ∅ and not A is false in A; hence A is a candidate world view of  w.r.t  = ∅. 
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some candidate world view w.r.t.  in polynomial time, and then continue to check that  is indeed proper with an oracle 
for Dp2 in polynomial time, by Theorem 4. As each problem in D
p
2 can be decided with two calls of an 
p
2 oracle, it follows 
that the problem is in p3 .
Hardness. The p3 -hardness of deciding candidate world view existence can be shown by a reduction from evaluating 
QBFs of the form
∃X∀Y∃Zφ, (A.1)
where X = X1, . . . , XnX , Y = Y1, . . . , YnY , and X = Z1, . . . , ZnZ are lists (viewed as sets) of distinct atoms, and φ =∧k
j=1(L j,1 ∨ L j,2 ∨ L j,3) is a CNF over atoms X ∪ Y ∪ Z , by lifting a reduction in [5] that proved p2 -completeness of deciding 
whether an atom U is false in all answer sets of a disjunctive logic program. Without loss of generality, we assume that by 
assigning each Yi ∈ Y the value true, the formula φ evaluates to true for every assignment to the remaining variables, i.e., 
the formula ∀X, Zφ[Y /] evaluates to true; hence, regardless of a concrete assignment σ to X the formula φ[X/σ , Y /]
will be satisﬁable.
For each atom A ∈ X ∪ Y ∪ Z , we introduce a fresh atom A¯, and we use further fresh atoms U and V . Let
X = {Xi ← not X¯i; X¯i ← not Xi | Xi ∈ X}, (A.2)
Y = {Yi ← ¬Y¯ i; Y¯ i ← ¬Yi | Yi ∈ Y }, (A.3)
Z = {Zi ∨ Z¯ i | Zi ∈ Z}, (A.4)
φ = {U ← L∗j,1 ∧ L∗j,3 ∧ L∗j,3 | 1≤ j ≤ k} ∪ (A.5)
{Zi ← U ; Z¯ i ← U | Zi ∈ Z} ∪ (A.6)
{V ← not V ,not¬U } (A.7)
where the operation ∗ converts each positive literal A into A¯ and each negative literal ¬A into A. If we suppose that X is 
void, the program Y ∪Z ∪φ \ {(A.7)} amounts to a (variant of) the program  in [5] for evaluating  = ∀Y∃Zφ such 
that U is false in all answer sets of  iff  evaluates to true; for each assignment μ to Y , which is guessed by the rules 
(A.3) the program  has some answer set candidate Iμ = {Yi ∈ Y | μ(Yi) = true} ∪ {Y¯ i ∈ Y | μ(Yi) = false} ∪ Z ∪ Z¯ ∪ {U }, 
where S¯ = { A¯ | A ∈ S}, that is an answer set if φ[Y /σ ] is unsatisﬁable; otherwise, if φ[Y /μ] is satisﬁable, some answer set 
I ⊂ Iμ exists and U is false in each such I . By our assumption, for μ =  (i.e., μ(Yi) = true for every Yi ∈ Y ) such an answer 
set exists, thus  has some answer set.
Now let us consider the case where X is non-void, and let  = X ∪ Y ∪ Z ∪ φ . Intuitively, the rules in X guess 
an assignment σ to X , and the candidate world view conditions amount to evaluating the QBF ∀Y∃Zφ[X/σ ]. Here, the 
rule (A.7) plays a crucial role; informally, it checks that in all answer sets of ( \ {(A.7)}) the atom U is false, without 
pruning answer sets in which U is true (note that a constraint ⊥ ← not¬U or V ← ¬V , not¬U would not work). Indeed, 
the rule (A.7) can be satisﬁed only by a guess  such that  ∩ {not V , not¬U } = {not V }, which means that V ← ¬¬U is 
in ; the candidate world conditions (a)–(c) are then met iff U is false in every answer set of ( \ {(A.7)}) . Otherwise, if 
not V /∈ , we have a rule V ← ¬V , · · · in  , and as V occurs in no other rule head,  has no answer set in which V
is true, and thus  violates condition (a) or (c); if not¬U , not V ∈ , then V is in  , and hence  violates condition (b).
Having clariﬁed the working of (A.7) for guesses  that have some candidate world views, we can verify that any such 
guess encodes a truth assignment σ to X . For not X¯i and not Xi , we have four possible cases for  j =  ∩ {not X¯i , not Xi}: 
1. 1 = ∅, 2. 2 = {not X¯i, not Xi}, 3. 3 = {not X¯i}, and 4. 4 = {not Xi}. Of these, 1 means that condition (c) is violated, 
as the program ( \ {(A.7)}) will contain rules
Xi ← ¬ X¯i; X¯i ← ¬Xi,
i.e., a choice between Xi and X¯i ; as these atoms do not occur in other rule heads, our assumption about φ implies that 
( \ {(A.7)}) has answer sets in which Xi resp. X¯i is false. Likewise, 2 does not yield a candidate world view: 
contains the facts Xi and X¯i , and thus condition (b) is violated. Thus, only 3 and 4 remain. In case of 3, the reduct 
contains
Xi ; X¯i ← ¬Xi
and thus each FLP answer set of  must contain Xi but not X¯i ; that is, 3 encodes that Xi is true in it. Similarly, for 4
each FLP answer set of  must contain X¯i but not Xi ; that is 4 encodes that Xi is false.
Putting things together, if  is guess that has some world view, then  encodes a truth assignment σ to X such that 
the formula ∀Y∃Zφ[X/σ ] evaluates to true; that is, ∃X∀Y∃Zφ evaluates to true. Conversely, if σ is a truth assignment to 
X such that ∀Y∃Zφ[X/σ ] evaluates to true, then the guess  = {not X¯i | σ(Xi) = true} ∪ {not Xi | σ(Xi) = false} ∪ {not¬U }
has some candidate world view. As  is clearly constructible in polynomial time from (A.1), this proves p3 -hardness of 
deciding candidate world view existence; furthermore, note that the rules in  match the syntax of (1).
(ii) Follows from (i), as some world view exists iff some candidate world view exists. 
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a candidate world view A w.r.t.  and  cautiously entails F . From Theorem 4 and [29] it follows that the guess can be 
veriﬁed with an p2 oracle in polynomial time; this proves membership in 
p
3 .
Hardness. p3 -hardness is a trivial from Theorem 5: a given program  has some candidate world view iff A is true in 
 ∪ {A} w.r.t. candidate world views, i.e., in some candidate world view of , where A is a fresh atom.
(ii) Membership. For a guess  as in (i), we must in addition test that no ′ ⊃  exists that has a candidate world view; 
by Theorem 5, the latter is in p3 . Thus in summary, a guess  that has a world view A in which F is true can be veriﬁed 
with a p3 oracle in polynomial; this proves 
p
4 membership.
Hardness. p4 -hardness is shown by generalizing the reduction in Theorem 5 to encode the evaluation of a QBF
∃W∀X∃Y∀Zψ, (A.8)
where ψ =∨kj=1 L j,1 ∧ L j,2 ∧ L j,3 is a DNF over atoms W ∪ X ∪ Y ∪ Z . Without loss of generality, we assume that ψ is 
unsatisﬁable if we assign each Yi ∈ Y the value true, i.e., ∀W , Y , Z¬ψ[Y /] evaluates to true.
Assume for the moment that W is void; then the negation of the QBF ∀X∃Y∀Zψ , i.e., ∃X∀Y∃Zφ were φ = ¬ψ , is 
encoded by the program  in the proof of Theorem 5. That is,  has some candidate world view iff ∀X∃Y∀Zψ evaluates 
to false. A modiﬁcation of  yields that maximality testing of a guess  is p3 -hard. To this end, let
0 = {H ← B ∧ A | H ← B ∈ } ∪ (A.9)
{Xi ← ¬A; X¯i ← ¬A | Xi ∈ X} ∪ {V ← ¬A} ∪ (A.10)
{A ← not¬A}, (A.11)
where A is a fresh atom, and  = ∅. It is easy to see that  has a candidate world view: I0 = X ∪ X¯ ∪ {V } is the single 
answer set of 0 , and for each epistemic negation not F in EP(0) = {not V , not¬U , not¬A, not Xi, not X¯i | Xi ∈ X} the 
formula F is true in I .
Furthermore, it holds that no guess ′ ⊃  has a candidate world view iff  has no candidate world view. To see 
the only if part, suppose some ′ ⊃  has a candidate world view. Then not¬A ∈ ′ must hold, as otherwise I0 is the 
single answer set of 
′
0 ; this would imply 
′ = , a contradiction. Now ′0 contains A ← and amounts to 
′
(simply 
eliminate A); it follows that  has a candidate world view w.r.t. ′ ∩ EP(). Conversely, if  has a candidate world view 
w.r.t. , then it is easy to see that 0 has a candidate world view w.r.t. ′ =  ∪ {not¬A}.
Thus, 0 has a world view w.r.t.  = ∅ iff the QBF ∀X∃Y∀Zψ evaluates to true (which proves p3 -hardness of world 
view checking, i.e., deciding given a program  and  ⊆ EP() whether  has some world view w.r.t. ). Note that since 
any other guess ′ ⊃  that has a candidate world view w.r.t. 0 must contain not¬A, we can equivalently ask whether 
¬A is true in 0 under EFLP semantics.
Now we generalize 0 to accommodate non-void W , i.e., to encode evaluating the QBF (A.8). To this end, we let
1 = 0∗ ∪ {Wi ← not W¯ i; W¯ i ← notWi | Wi ∈ W }
where W¯ i is a fresh atom for Wi and 0∗ is constructed like 0 where in the construction of the rules (A.5) of  each 
Wi (resp. ¬Wi) literal is replaced by W¯ i (resp. Wi).11 Note that Wi and W¯ i do not occur in ∗0 in rule heads; combined 
with the assumption that ∀W , X, Z¬ψ[Y /] evaluates to true, by similar reasoning as in the proof of Theorem 5 for Wi
and W¯ i in place of Xi and X¯i , we obtain that every guess  ⊆ EP(1) such that 1 has a candidate world view w.r.t. 
 must contain exactly one of notWi and not W¯ i , and thus  encodes a truth assignment ν to W where ν(Wi) = true
if not W¯ i ∈  (as Wi and W¯ i ← ¬Wi are in 1 ) and ν(Wi) = false if notWi ∈  (as W¯ i and Wi ← ¬W¯ i are in 1 ). 
Furthermore, if not¬A /∈ , then  contains no other epistemic negations, and we denote it by ν ; if not¬A ∈ , then the 
QBF ∀X∃Y∀Zψ[W /ν] must evaluate to false. Thus, if ν has a world view, then ∀X∃Y∀Zψ[W /ν] evaluates to true. On the 
other hand, every truth assignment to W is encoded by some ν ; thus, it follows that some ν has a world view iff the 
QBF (A.8) evaluates to true. As ¬A is true in the candidate world view of a guess  iff  = ν for some ν , it follows that 
¬A is true in 1 under EFLP semantics iff the QBF (A.8) evaluates to true. As 1 is constructible in polynomial time from 
(A.8), this proves p4 -hardness. 
Appendix B. Programs matching normal epistemic speciﬁcations
We show that the complexity of world view existence drops by one level in the polynomial hierarchy for normal epistemic 
speciﬁcations with rules of the form
L0 ← L1 ∧ . . . ∧ Lm ∧ (¬)not Lm+1 ∧ . . . ∧ (¬)not Ln (B.1)
11 As φ = ¬ψ , the ﬁnal rules (A.9) that emerge from (A.5) are of the form U ← L†j,1 ∧ L†j,3 ∧ L†j,3 ∧ A where for any atom C we have C † = C and ¬C † = C¯ .
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m = 1 (the modal atom MA amounts to not¬A, and ¬¬A = A under FLP semantics).12
Formally, we obtain, were Dp = Dp1 is the analog of Dp2 where p2 /p2 is replaced by NP/coNP:
Theorem 7. Given a propositional program  that is a normal epistemic speciﬁcation and a guess  for it, deciding whether  has a 
candidate world view w.r.t.  is Dp-complete.
Proof. Membership. The proof of Dp membership is analogous to the one of Theorem 4, where NP/coNP replaces p2 /
p
2 .
Hardness. The Dp-hardness follows from the reduction in the proof of Theorem 4: if the pair (1, 2) consists of normal 
logic programs, deciding whether 1 has some FLP answer set and 2 has no FLP answer set is Dp-complete. Furthermore, 
the program  constructed from (1, 2) matches a normal epistemic speciﬁcation. 
Theorem 8. Given a propositional program  that is a normal epistemic speciﬁcation, deciding whether  has (i) some candidate 
world view and (ii) some world view are both p2 -complete.
Proof. Membership. The membership proof is analogous to the one of Theorem 5, but uses Theorem 8 instead of Theorem 4.
Hardness. The p2 -hardness is inherited from the reduction in Theorem 5: if we consider a QBF (A.1) in which Z is void, 
the resulting program  matches normal epistemic speciﬁcations, and has some candidate world view iff ∃X∀Y¬φ, where 
φ is a CNF, evaluates to true. Evaluating such QBFs is p2 -complete, and remains 
p
2 -hard even if φ is unsatisﬁable if each 
Yi ∈ Y is assigned true, i.e., the QBF ∀X¬φ[Y /] evaluates to true. 
Theorem 9. Given a propositional program  that is a normal epistemic speciﬁcation and a propositional formula F , deciding whether 
F is true in  (i) w.r.t. candidate world views is ps -complete, and (ii) w.r.t. world views, i.e., under EFLP semantics, is 
p
3 -complete.
Proof. Membership. The membership proofs are analogous to the one of Theorem 6, but use Theorem 8 instead of Theo-
rem 4 and the fact that for any guess ,  is a normal logic program, and cautious inference form the answer sets of 
such programs is coNP-complete [23].
Hardness. The p2 -hardness of (i) is immediate from the reduction in the proof of item (i) of Theorem 6 and Theorem 8. 
The p3 -hardness of (ii) is shown by generalizing the encoding of evaluating a QBF ∃X∀Yψ to deciding candidate world 
existence for a program  that matches normal epistemic speciﬁcations in Theorem 8 in the same way as in the proof of 
item (ii) in Theorem 6; note that all rules created match normal epistemic speciﬁcations. 
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